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12 fingers or one, it’s how you play?  Genetic Discrimination in the Australian 
Workforce 
James Duffy* 
For quite some time, debate has raged about what the human race can and should do 
with its knowledge of genetics.  We are now nearly 60 years removed from the work of 
Watson and Crick who determined the structure of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), yet 
our opinions as how best to employ scientific knowledge of the human genome remain 
as diverse and polarised as ever.  Human judgment is often shaped and coloured by 
popular media and culture, so it should come as no surprise that box office movies such 
as Gattaca (1997) continue to play a role in informing public opinion on genetics.  In 
order to perform well at the box office, movies such as Gattaca take great liberty in 
sensationalising (and even distorting) the implications that may result from genetic 
screening and testing.  If the public’s opinion on human genetics is strongly derived 
from the box office and popular media, then it is no wonder that the discourse on 
human genetics is couched in the polar parlances of future utopias or future dystopias.  
When legislating on an issue like genetic discrimination in the workforce, we must be 
mindful of not overplaying the causal link between genetic predisposition towards a 
disability and an employee’s ability to perform the inherent requirements of their job.  
Genetic information is ultimately about people, it is not about genes.  Genetic 
discrimination is ultimately about actions, it is not about the intrinsic value of genetic 
information. 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this article is to analyse the issue of genetic discrimination in the Australian 
workforce, using the movie Gattaca as a case study.  More so than other pop-culture films, 
Gattaca seems to have struck a chord with academics, politicians and law reform bodies who 
are debating the best way to legally regulate genetic information.  The 2003 Australian Law 
Reform Commission report entitled ‘Essentially Yours:  The Protection of Human Genetic 
Information in Australia’1 contains references to the movie Gattaca, suggesting that this 
fictional work has (at least to a small degree) informed law reform proposals. 
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Legal analysis of a popular culture movie therefore has academic merit, especially in an area 
like human genetics where the law struggles to keep pace with technology, which leaves it 
susceptible to legislative responses driven by public opinion.  When commenting on the role 
that creative arts play in bioethical debates, Tsitas2 highlights the important contribution that 
fiction writers make: ‘they step out of the now, the probable, the literal, the factual and 
explore the unthinkable, the unimaginable.  Fiction writers are not constrained by facts, law 
or current reality, they ask "what if"? and then take us down that path.’3  Over the last ten 
years, the challenge for legislators in respect of genetic discrimination has been to balance the 
expectations of the public (informed heavily by pop-culture) against the advancing 
sophistication of genetic testing.  The Federal Parliament’s decision to outlaw genetic 
discrimination in the workplace is a measured response, adopted in an environment where the 
predictive value of genetic information is still developing. 
 
An Introduction to Gattaca 
 
Gattaca paints a bleak image of Earth ‘in the not too distant future’, where employment and 
social status at the Gattaca Aerospace Corporation are a by-product of genetic make-up, 
rather than personality, loyalty or perseverance.  Vincent Freeman (Ethan Hawke) is a 
naturally born baby in a society where pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (in essence embryo 
screening) can ensure that a child receives the best hereditary traits of its parents.  As a result 
of Vincent’s ‘faith birth’, he is born with a 60 percent chance of suffering from a neurological 
condition, a 42 percent probability of suffering manic depression, an 89 percent chance of 
suffering attention deficit disorder and a 99 percent chance of suffering from a heart disorder.  
His life expectancy is expressed accurate to one decimal point – 30.2 years. 
 
Vincent’s childhood dream had been to fly into space, and his early years were dedicated to 
the acquisition of knowledge and the achievement of physical fitness sufficient to realise this 
goal.  He is initially unsuccessful with job applications, on the basis that pre-employment 
genetic screening exposes his predisposition towards a number of undesirable genetic 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
1 Australian Law Reform Commission, Essentially Yours:  The Protection of Human Genetic Information in 
Australia, Report No 96 (Sydney, March 2003). 
2 Evelyn Tsitas, ‘The Role of the Creative Arts in Bioethical Debates’ (2006) 6(2) Queensland University of 
Technology Law and Justice Journal 255. 
3 Ibid 260. 
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conditions.  Vincent ultimately gains employment at the Gattaca Aerospace Corporation by 
borrowing numerous DNA samples (and ultimately assuming the identity of) Jerome 
Morrow, a genetically superior individual who is wheelchair bound after a failed suicide 
attempt.  These DNA samples are necessary for Vincent to overcome the initial obstacle of 
gaining employment and are vital in maintaining the charade of genetic perfection required of 
Gattaca astronauts.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to critique the obstacles to employment within the Gattaca 
Aerospace Corporation, and draw specific attention to the issue of genetic discrimination and 
the social implications that may flow from genetic discrimination in the workforce. 
 
Genetic Discrimination 
 
Genetic discrimination can be defined as the differential treatment of an asymptomatic 
individual on the basis of real or assumed genetic differences or characteristics.4  Essential to 
this definition is the genotype/phenotype distinction drawn by Wilhelm Johannsen in 1911.5  
Genetic discrimination is based on a person’s genotype (genetic makeup).  This means that an 
individual is discriminated against based on her/his genetic predisposition towards a 
particular disease, regardless of whether that disease ever manifests itself.  Professor 
Margaret Otlowski reasons:   
once a disease has become manifest, discrimination on the grounds of that disease would not 
constitute genetic discrimination as at that point, the discrimination is based on the person’s 
phenotype (the disease as expressed), and would amount to discrimination on the basis of 
actual disability rather than genetic status.6 
 
Given the wide consensus as to the meaning of genetic discrimination, Gattaca’s implication 
that Vincent Freeman had been the subject of genetic discrimination (‘genoism’) is 
technically incorrect.  Vincent’s myopia and heart condition represent physically observable, 
expressed symptoms and discrimination on these bases would constitute disability 
discrimination rather than genetic discrimination. 
                                                            
4 L Geller et al, ‘Individual, family and societal dimensions of genetic discrimination:  A case study analysis’ 
(1996) 2(1) Science and Engineering Ethics 71. 
5 Wilhem Johannsen, ‘The genotype conception of heredity’ (1911) 45 American Naturalist 129. 
6 Margaret Otlowski, ‘Exploring the Concept of Genetic Discrimination’ (2005) 2(3) Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 
165 at 166. 
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Application of the Australian Legal Matrix to Gattaca 
 
The assertion in Gattaca that genetic discrimination is illegal, presupposes that laws exist 
outlawing the practice of genetic discrimination in the workforce.  After acknowledging the 
genotype/phenotype dichotomy, it is perhaps ironic that in Australia, genetic discrimination 
in employment is made illegal by the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).7  One 
difficulty faced by Australian workplaces is that until recent legislative clarification, it had 
been unclear whether a genetic predisposition towards a disability would meet the definition 
of ‘disability’ contained in section 4 of the Disability Discrimination Act.  As a consequence, 
if a genetic predisposition towards disability was not captured by the definition of ‘disability’, 
it was arguable that genetic discrimination in Australia was legal.  Appreciating this potential 
for confusion, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) and the Australian Health 
Ethics Committee (AHEC) in a 2003 joint report to the Australian Government,8 
recommended that the definition of ‘disability’ in the Disability Discrimination Act be 
amended to clarify that the legislation applied to discrimination based on genetic status.   
 
The Australian Government’s response to the recommendations of the ALRC was published 
on 9 December 2005.9  The Government supported the recommendation that the definition of 
disability in the Disability Discrimination Act include a genetic predisposition towards a 
disability.10 However, implementation was slow in coming, and it was not until the 
commencement of the Disability Discrimination and Other Human Rights Legislation 
Amendment Act 2009 (Cth) that discrimination based on genetic status was explicitly made 
illegal.11  In the context of Australian law, the assertion in Gattaca that genetic discrimination 
is illegal has proven to be correct.  At the time the movie was released (1997) however, it 
could not be conclusively stated that genetic discrimination was illegal in Australia. 
 
Even if genetic discrimination is established by an employee prima facie, the Disability 
Discrimination Act provides for circumstances where this discrimination is lawful.  If an 
                                                            
7 Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s15(1). 
8 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 1. 
9 Government Response to Recommendations from Essentially Yours:  The Protection of Human Genetic 
Information in Australia, Report No 96, http://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/title/alrc96/agd.htm at 4 April 2010. 
10 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 1, Recommendation 9‐3. 
11 The definition of ‘disability’ in section 4 the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) was amended to include 
a disability that: ‘(j) may exist in the future (including because of a genetic predisposition to that disability)’. 
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employee, because of his/her disability is unable to carry out the inherent requirements of the 
job, it is lawful for an employer to discriminate on the grounds of that genetic disability.12  It 
is also lawful for an employer to genetically discriminate if they would suffer unjustifiable 
hardship by not being able to do so.13  This is where Gattaca’s treatment of genetic 
discrimination is at best incomplete and at worst, disingenuous. 
 
It is acknowledged that discriminating against an asymptomatic individual on the basis of a 
genetic predisposition towards a disability is an ethically challenging notion.  After all, the 
genetic condition may never manifest itself physically, or if it does, it may manifest quite late 
in life.  Gattaca’s portrayal of its protagonist’s (Vincent) hardships speaks subtly yet 
powerfully about the undesirability of genetic discrimination.  The tagline for the film spruiks 
that ‘there is no gene for the human spirit’, and suggests humans are capable of achieving 
anything regardless of their genetic condition.  The movie underscores how genetic 
discrimination in the workplace reinforces genetic discrimination in society.  As a result, 
Gattaca highlights the real danger that a genetic underclass may evolve; a class with a 
diminished social status and limited employment opportunities. 
 
If ever genetic discrimination could be justified (and it is suggested in this paper that it can), 
then surely an organisation like the Gattaca Aerospace Corporation should have that 
prerogative.  Contra to the strong moral stance taken against genetic discrimination in 
Gattaca, it is suggested that the Disability Discrimination Act would allow the Gattaca 
Aerospace Corporation to genetically discriminate when hiring and firing employees.  
Section 21A of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) states: 
(1) This Division does not render it unlawful for a person (the discriminator) to discriminate 
against another person (the aggrieved) on the ground of a disability of the aggrieved person if: 
 (a) the discrimination relates to particular work (including promotion or transfer to 
 particular work); and 
 (b) because of the disability, the aggrieved person would be unable to carry out the 
 inherent requirements of the particular work, even if the relevant  employer, principal 
 or partnership made reasonable adjustments for the aggrieved person. 
 
                                                            
12 Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), s21A. 
13 Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), s21B. 
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Assume for a moment that Vincent Freeman was genetically predisposed to a neurological 
condition (Huntington’s disease), myopia and a heart condition, but is currently 
asymptomatic.  This article suggests that it would be lawful for the Gattaca Aerospace 
Corporation to refuse to employ Vincent on the basis of his genetic condition, given that he 
would be unable to carry out the inherent requirements of the job.  When assessing what the 
inherent requirements of a job entail, McHugh J in X v The Commonwealth14 stated: 
Employment is not a mere physical activity in which the employee participates as an 
automaton.  It takes place in a social, legal and economic context.  Unstated, but legitimate 
employment requirements may stem from this context.  It is therefore always permissible to 
have regard to this context when determining the inherent requirements of a particular 
employment.15 
 
These broader considerations need to be read alongside the joint judgment of Gummow and 
Hayne JJ, who concluded that the inherent requirements of a job must entail the 
circumstances in which the particular employment will be carried on.16 
Those circumstances will often include the place or places at which the employment is to be 
performed and may also encompass other considerations.  For example, it may be necessary 
to consider whether the employee is to work with others in some particular way.  It may also 
be necessary to consider the dangers to which the employee may be exposed and the dangers 
to which the employee may expose others.17 
 
The physical rigours of working as an astronaut are intense.  The Gattaca Aerospace 
Corporation could assert that the physical training and intensity of space travel would pose a 
real danger to Vincent given his genetic predispositions.  If such working conditions 
increased the possibility of a heart condition suddenly manifesting (heart attack), then the 
Gattaca Aerospace Corporation should have the lawful right to refuse Vincent employment 
on the basis that such employment would be detrimental to his own health.  This right 
assumes great importance in light of workplace health and safety laws and an employer’s 
duty of care in respect to its employees.18 
 
                                                            
14 (1999) 200 CLR 177. 
15 Ibid, [33]. 
16 Ibid, [103]. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Under the Occupation Health and Safety Act 1991 (Cth) s 16, a duty is placed on an employer to take all 
reasonably practicable steps to protect the health, safety and welfare of all employees at work. 
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Vincent’s genetic predispositions also could expose fellow employees to dangerous 
situations.  Space travel with Vincent could have fatal consequences for his co-workers if his 
predisposition towards Huntington’s disease were to suddenly manifest.  One of the early 
symptoms of Huntington’s disease is irrational behaviour.19  Given the specific (and often 
complicated) tasks that must be completed by astronauts in space, it is not difficult to 
envisage a scenario where the onset of sudden, irrational psychiatric behaviour could put the 
safety and welfare of other employees at risk. 
 
Finally, the Gattaca Aerospace Corporation and the general public might suffer significant 
financial harm if the company could not lawfully discriminate against Vincent due to his 
genetic condition.  Space travel is an expensive endeavour (requiring billions of dollars of 
public and private funds) and the economic consequences of failed missions can be 
catastrophic.  To minimise the chance of failure, the Gattaca Aerospace Corporation should 
legally possess the right to refuse Vincent employment as an astronaut on the basis that his 
genetic predispositions could jeopardise billions of dollars of private (and public) money. 
 
Despite Gattaca’s negative view of genetic discrimination in the workforce, there may be one 
small concession that genetic discrimination may be warranted in certain circumstances.  In a 
scene from the movie, Vincent and his love interest Irene attend a musical concert performed 
by a 12 fingered pianist.  After the concert is completed, Irene asks Vincent whether he knew 
that the piano player had 12 fingers.  Vincent shrugs in reply and states, ‘12 fingers or one, 
it’s how you play’.  Irene then informs Vincent that the piece played by the pianist could only 
be performed with 12 fingers. 
 
It is suggested that this interplay between Vincent and Irene is analogous to the broader issue 
of genetic discrimination, and whether it is ever justifiable.  There is no doubt that genetic 
discrimination in the workforce is an unfortunate outcome whenever it occurs.  If an 
employee is able to carry out the inherent requirements of a job, they should never be refused 
employment on account of their asymptomatic genetic condition (‘12 fingers or one, it’s how 
you play’).  Some jobs, however, necessitate that an employee has (or does not have) a 
particular genetic profile.  Due to the inherent requirements of such roles, an employer is 
legally entitled (and perhaps morally obliged) to discriminate against an individual who 
                                                            
19 Margaret Otlowski, ‘Employers’ Use of Genetic Test Information:  Is there a need for Regulation?’ (2002) 15 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 1, 17. 
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possesses certain genetic predispositions.  The danger posed to the employee themselves, the 
danger to which the employee may expose co-workers and the danger posed to broader 
society, all militate towards the appropriateness of genetic discrimination in certain contexts.  
Some piano pieces can only be performed with 12 fingers.  
 
Current Legal Framework vs Genetic Exceptionalism 
 
Leaving aside the specific case study of Gattaca, it is suggested in this paper that the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) is the appropriate legal vehicle for addressing issues 
of genetic discrimination in the workforce.  Any law that purports to deal with genetic 
discrimination must balance the concerns of competing stakeholders – the employee, fellow 
employees, the employer and the public at large.  It would be undesirable to vindicate or give 
primacy to individual rights (i.e., the right not to be discriminated against) without 
considering the context in which competing positions or rights may arise.  The example given 
above demonstrates that in some circumstances, the right not to be genetically discriminated 
against should be trumped by concerns for the health of the employee, the safety of other 
employees and the well being of the public.  The Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) 
achieves this balance by prima facie interdicting the practice of genetic discrimination,20 yet 
winding back this prohibition if the discriminatory conduct falls under a particular 
exception.21 
 
The alternative to dealing with genetic discrimination under the Disability Discrimination Act 
1992 (Cth) is to enact genetic-specific legislation in Australia.  This course of action is not 
without precedent.  The United States of America Senate passed the Genetic Information 
Non-discrimination Act (GINA) in May 2008,22 ten years after Senator Natasha Stott Despoja 
introduced – without success – the Genetic Privacy and Non-discrimination Bill to the 
Federal Parliament of Australia.  This article suggests that genetic specific legislation is no 
better suited to the task of preventing genetic discrimination then more general anti-
discrimination legislation.  There are strong arguments to suggest that genetic specific 
legislation may prove counterproductive. 
 
                                                            
20 Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), s 15. 
21 Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), s 21A. 
22 Part 1 of the Genetic Information Non‐discrimination Act deals with genetic discrimination in health 
insurance and Part 2 of the Act covers genetic discrimination in the workforce. 
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The idea of genetic specific legislation plays like a sweet melody to those who sing the tune 
of genetic exceptionalism.  The phrase ‘genetic exceptionalism’ was initially coined by 
Thomas Murray23 and encapsulates a view of genetic information as so unique and powerful 
(vis-a-vis other forms of personal and medical information) that its use must be regulated by 
special policies and/or legislation.24  Proponents of genetic exceptionalism highlight: 
 
1. Genetic information can identify an individual’s pre-disposition towards a condition 
or disability.  As a result, such information can ‘affect and undermine an individual’s 
view of his/her life’s possibilities.’25 
2. Genetic information is relational in nature, which means that such information 
extends beyond the individual and provides information about that individual’s 
parents, siblings and children.26 
3. Genetic information is highly sensitive in nature and many individuals would prefer 
that others were not privy to their genetic test results.  Given that therapies for genetic 
disorders have not progressed concurrently with our ability to identify genetic 
disorders, an individual may not wish to know about their own genetic makeup.27 
 
These characteristics of genetic information drive exceptionalists to the conclusion that a 
phenomenon like genetic discrimination is best met with genetic specific legislation. 
 
The difficulty with genetic specific legislation is the subtle social undertone that it carries.  
Even though genetic information is unique to an individual, it does not follow that it should 
be the subject of unique stand-alone legislation.  Thomas Murray argues:  
we do not have to pretend that genes are unimportant to avoid [genetic] determinism or 
reductionism.  We should give genes their due, but no more than that... [T]here is a vicious 
circularity in insisting that genetic information is different and must be given special 
treatment.  The more we repeat that genetic information is fundamentally unlike other kinds 
                                                            
23 Thomas H Murray, ‘Genetic Exceptionalism and “Future Diaries”:  Is Genetic Information Different From 
Other Medical Information?’ in M Rothstein (ed), Genetic Secrets:  Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality in the 
Genetic Era (1997) Yale University Press, New Haven, 60. 
24 Otlowski, above n 6, 168. 
25 G Annas, L Glantz and P Roche, ‘Drafting the Genetic Privacy Act: Science, Policy and Practical 
Considerations’ (1995) 23 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 360, 360. 
26 Anne Mainsbridge, ‘Employers and Genetic Information:  A New Frontier For Discrimination’ (2002) 2 
Macquarie Law Journal 61, 65. 
27 Ibid. 
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of medical information, the more support we implicitly provide for genetic determinism, for 
the notion that genetics exerts special influence over our lives.28 
 
In the context of genetic discrimination in the workforce, it is imperative that employers do 
not overestimate the importance and predictive power of genes.  Ekberg contends that such 
overestimation is synonymous with concepts of genetic determinism, genetic reductionism, 
genetic essentialism and genetic fatalism.29  Her argument is that ‘such concepts are 
misleading because they ignore the role the social and physical environment play in the 
aetiology of all disease and the expression of all human traits.’30  Putting aside for one second 
the multi-factorial nature of so many genetic disorders (and the contribution that physical 
environment plays), we cannot ignore the social drivers that promulgate genetic 
discrimination.  If employers believe that the genetic profile of an employee constitutes a 
‘coded probabilistic future diary’,31 they will find a way not to employ an individual who is 
genetically predisposed to a disability, regardless of what a piece of legislation mandates.   
 
Perhaps the key is changing the social mindset of the actors involved in genetic workplace 
discrimination.  When discussing ‘How not to think about Genetic Information’,32 Manson 
argues:  
we risk thinking of certain kinds of information as possessing an intrinsic ethical significance 
– such that any use of it is ethically problematic – rather than recognising that what matters, 
ethically speaking, is always types of action, and that the actions that use medical information 
form a heterogeneous class.33 
 
As a pop culture example of this phenomenon, Gattaca provides a perfect example of a 
society that has ‘bought in’ to the idea of genetic exceptionalism.  This society’s focus on the 
intrinsic value and significance of genetic information has bred a culture where genetic pre-
disposition towards a disability has become a real, biological and neutral ground for 
                                                            
28 Murray, above n 23, 70‐71. 
29 Merryn Eckberg, ‘Governing the Risks Emerging From the Non‐Medical Uses of Genetic Testing’ (2005) 3(1) 
Australian Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society 1, 12. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Annas, Glantz and Roche, above n 25, 360. 
32 Neil C Manson, ‘How Not to Think about Genetic Information’ (2005) 35(4) Hastings Center Report 3. 
33 Ibid. 
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differential treatment.34  No ethical significance is placed on the decision of an employer to 
discriminate based on genome – it is simply a logical course of action that follows the 
discovery of a genetic abnormality. 
 
Conclusion 
 
James Watson, director of the Human Genome Initiative, claims that our fate is in our 
genes.35  Gattaca claims that there is no gene for fate.  Which view is correct?  It is suggested 
in this article that the pop culture view should prevail.  Personhood and what it means to be 
human is being challenged by advances in genetic technology.  We must not forget that we 
are in a unique position to determine the social significance of genetic information.  There is 
a human element to genetic information that is separate and must remain divorced from the 
science.  Legislative responses to issues like genetic discrimination play a role in preserving 
the social side of genetics.  If the message that genetic specific legislation exudes is that 
genetic information is uniquely powerful and uniquely personal,36 then employers who are 
governed by that legislation will treat genetic test results of employees (or potential 
employees) as being uniquely important.  The irony of this result is that genetic specific 
legislation designed to combat discrimination may to an extent end up promoting it.  By 
dealing with genetic discrimination under the current Disability Discrimination Act 
framework, we acknowledge that a genetic disability (or genetic pre-disposition towards a 
disability) is no more special than other forms of medical disability.  We give genes their due, 
but no more than that. 
 
 
                                                            
34 Susan Wolf, ‘Beyond Genetic Discrimination:  Towards the Broader Harm of Geneticism’ (1995) 23(4) Journal 
of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 345‐353 as cited in Anne Mainsbridge, ‘Employers and Genetic Information:  A 
New Frontier For Discrimination’ (2002) 2 Macquarie Law Journal 61, 82. 
35 Leon Jaroff, The Gene Hunt, Time, March 20 1989. 
36 Annas, Glantz and Roche, above n 25, 365. 
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